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ARE FOREIGN OWNED FIRMS MORE LIKELY TO PAY BRIBES THAN 
DOMESTIC ONES?  EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING MARKETS 
ABSTRACT 
An extensive literature exists on the adverse effects of corruption on inward FDI and the impact this 
may have on economic development but the reverse causality has not been fully explored. Legislation 
in the US and the EU prohibits firms from engaging in corrupt practices in foreign countries and this 
suggests that foreign owned firms might be less likely to pay bribes.  However, such legislation may 
be ineffective because foreign firms have to adapt to local market conditions or risk being 
uncompetitive.  Using firm level data for 41 emerging countries, a probit model estimates the 
probability that a firm pays bribes.  To allow for possible endogeneity this probit analysis is repeated 
with an instrument to proxy for endogenous foreign ownership. Then, a propensity score matching 
technique tests for differences in the propensity to pay bribes by domestic and foreign firms. The 
paper finds that no difference is the behaviour of foreign owned and domestic firms with respect to 
corrupt practices.  Results are robust to different levels of foreign ownership and support the view that 
foreign owned firms adapt to local practices and are neither more nor less likely to pay bribes than 
comparable domestic firms.  The paper finds that other variables including bureaucracy, government 
contracts and perceived difficulties with civil society (legal and political) do have statistically 
significant effects on increasing bribery and that some others, such as per capita GDP, tend to reduce 
bribery. The study concludes that there is no evidence that foreign ownership, after investment has 
occurred, tends to reduce bribery but it does support the view that foreign owned firms adopt local 
behavioural norms.  
KEYWORDS Inward FDI, Corruption, Emerging markets, Propensity score matching 
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HIGHLIGHTS 
• Home country legislation prohibits corrupt practices for inward FDI firms but in some 
environments this makes them uncompetitive with host country firms 
• The propensity to engage in corrupt practices in emerging markets is the same for 
foreign and domestic firms if it is necessary to circumvent cumbersome bureaucracy 
• This result is robust to the degree of foreign ownership of a firm  
• Propensity score matching provides an unbiased method of comparing sub-groups  
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ARE FOREIGN OWNED FIRMS MORE LIKELY TO PAY BRIBES THAN 
DOMESTIC ONES?  EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING MARKETS 
1. Introduction  
Corruption has been an issue of considerable importance in both the international business and 
economic development literatures for some time.  This interest is not surprising as corruption can be 
both a barrier to investment (Mauro, 1995) and lead to higher costs to the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993).  However, the nature of the relationship between corruption and development has been 
questioned.  The established view is that there is an inverse relationship between corruption and 
economic growth (Truex, 2011) although this may not be the case where institutions are weak (Méon 
and Weill, 2010). 
The literature on international business has focused on the deterrent effects of bribery on 
inward investment. There have been only a few studies of the effects of foreign owned firms on 
bribery and those that do exist have tended to focus on a single country.  The literature on the 
determinants of corruption comprises a larger body of work but foreign ownership is considered as a 
possible determinant only in a small number of studies, typically as a dummy variable and as one of 
several control variables.  Thus, the major contribution of the paper is to provide a more focussed 
examination of the role of foreign owned firms in bribery practices than exists in either the 
international business or corruption literature.  This study does not consider the role of foreign 
ownership in isolation but also focuses on bureaucracy, bidding for government contracts and polity 
(political instability, crime, corruption and the courts) in determining corruption.  These, too, have 
been considered elsewhere in the literature but this study adopts a more focused approach to them. In 
keeping with the literature on corruption this study uses firm level data for a number of countries.  
Firm level data comes with the problem of firm heterogeneity which can create a risk of sample 
selection bias.  To address these heterogeneity problems a matching approach is used.  As far as the 
authors are aware this study is the first to apply inverse probability weighted regression adjustment 
(IPWRA) techniques to the determinants of corruption. 
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One aspect of the recent literature has focused on the deterrent effect of bribery on inward 
investment particularly in emerging market countries but also more generally.  Two important ideas 
that arise from this motivate this paper. The first concerns the question of whether foreign owned 
firms tend to reduce corruption in host countries or simply find themselves compelled to adopt local 
standards and practices.  The introduction of legal requirements in both the US and the European 
Union to refrain from corruption in foreign countries provides a clear motive for suspecting that the 
participation of foreign owned firms in the host country might reduce corruption levels.  It is clearly 
the case that paying bribes might expose them to prosecution in their home country and, hence, alter 
their behaviour.  But the opposite may be the case as no matter how worthy home country legislation 
might be foreign owned firms face the reality of having to operate according to local standards and 
practices or risk being uncompetitive. Despite the risk of home country recrimination it is argued that 
they have little choice other than to compete with local firms even if this involves paying bribes.  The 
second strand of recent research considers that whilst official corruption is never the first best 
solution, it may be better than nothing where a particularly obstructive and cumbersome bureaucracy 
is in place. This reasoning is not the main focus of this study but we do consider the likelihood that 
corruption and cumbersome bureaucracy are related. 
This study does not set out to provide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of 
bribery. Its focus is on whether the fact that firms are foreign owned affects bribery or not. 
Nonetheless, any analysis of the role of foreign ownership affects bribery in host markets only makes 
sense in the context of a wider model of its determinants. Based on existing literature the study also 
considers a number of potential firm-level determinants of bribery. These include government 
contracts, bureaucracy, perceived legal and political obstacles and indicators of firm competitiveness.  
A number of country-level determinants are also considered. These include regulatory efficiency, per 
capita GDP and natural resource rents (as a percentage of GDP).  The findings that many of these 
variables do indeed have statistically significant effects on bribery, and that foreign firms tend to 
adapt to rather than change local behavioural norms, has obvious policy implications. 
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This is clearly of interest to policy makers, who are aware of the adverse effects of corruption 
in international firms on economic growth in emerging and newly industrialised economies. The key 
question from the policy perspective is whether legislation in home countries has been effective in 
making foreign firms less likely to pay bribes than domestic ones.  It is also of interest to managers of 
firms from those countries who have introduced legal sanctions at home against firms that engage in 
corruption in other countries. These firms face a potential dilemma. On one hand, if the legislation is 
enforced, they risk sanctions in their home country, while on the other hand if corruption is expected 
in a particular host country it may not be possible for their affiliates or subsidiaries to compete 
effectively abroad.  Therefore, understanding the typical behaviour of other foreign firms in this 
situation is of value for the development of appropriate overseas business strategies. 
Whilst is it often asserted that bribery is a particularly acute problem in emerging market 
countries, this study does not address whether this is or is not an accurate stereotype. The sample is 
drawn from emerging and newly industrialised markets because that is where corruption is believed to 
be an important issue although this is not necessarily the case.  However, the sample raises two further 
issues with respect to the quality of governance and level of development.  It is important to note that 
the sample does not include China or India.  This is not because these countries are not of major 
importance but firm level data are limited and neither is included in the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey, which is the source of data used here. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 discusses the literature on corruption in the context 
of international business and economic development and a number of testable hypotheses are 
developed.  Section 3 describes the data and methods used.   The next two sections report the results 
of the probit estimation and propensity score matching followed by a discussion and section 6 
concludes. 
2. Review of literature and hypothesis development 
This study concerns two related and overlapping strands of literature.  Its focus is on the role of 
affiliates of foreign firms.  The literature on FDI and corruption has been dominated by analysis of the 
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deterrent effects of corruption on inward FDI (causality: corruption to FDI).  An under researched 
aspect of the literature which has only started to be addressed more recently is the effects of foreign 
ownership on corruption (causality: foreign ownership to corruption).  This paper is one of the few 
attempts in the FDI literature to assess whether foreign owned firms offer benefits to host countries in 
the form of reduced corruption. It is not, as with Rose Ackerman (2002), an analysis of whether 
foreign firms should be obliged to reduce corruption but an empirical assessment of whether they do 
in reality. 
The literature from the perspective of the costs and benefits of inward FDI inevitably overlaps 
with the literature on the determinants of corruption more generally.  A small number of studies 
within the determinants of corruption literature have analysed the effects of foreign ownership 
(usually in the form of a dummy variable) on corruption, typically finding no statistically significant 
effect.  This study’s focus on foreign ownership as a potential determinant allows a more thorough 
examination of the role of foreign ownership in relation to other potential determinants of corruption.  
Firm level studies such as this have become increasingly used in the determinants of corruption 
literature, typically with probit (which this study uses) or logit regression models.  However, problems 
of firm heterogeneity have long been recognised as an issue with micro level data. To address such 
issues a matching approach is introduced.  In addition, we use Inverse Probability Weighted 
Regression Analysis (IPWRA), a method that to the best of our knowledge has not previously been 
applied in studies of the determinants of corruption. The results presented here show that it produces 
clear conclusions from the fog of firm heterogeneity. 
Evidence that corruption has had an adverse effect on both investment and economic growth 
has existed in the economic development literature for some time. For example, in a cross country 
study Mauro (1995) found that corruption adversely affected both investment and per capital GDP 
growth.  The literature more specifically related to foreign owned firms is more recent but is still well 
established. Wei (2000) examined the relationship between FDI and corruption using bilateral country 
level data and found that corruption had a negative effect on direct investment similar to an increase 
in the tax rate.  A country level analysis of FDI by Habib and Zurawicki (2001) found a statistically 
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significant negative impact of corruption on FDI inflows.  In a separate study of FDI inflows the same 
authors found that corruption was a significant and serious obstacle to inward FDI (Habib and 
Zurawicki¸ 2002).  Globerman and Shapiro (2002) examined the relationship between the quality of 
governance and FDI flows (inward and outward) at the country level and found good governance to 
have a significant positive effect on FDI flows.  Similarly, in a study of US outward investment good 
governance was an important determinant of the location choices made by US investors Globerman 
and Shapiro, 2003).  
In a country level analysis of the relationship between FDI and corruption, Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2006) found that in general corruption discourages inward investment. However, behavioural 
differences with respect to the home country of foreign investors were identified. That is, investment 
from countries that were signatories to the OECD convention on combatting bribery was deterred by 
corruption but investment from countries where bribery is prevalent was not deterred but maybe even 
encouraged. Hakkala et al (2008) analysed the relationship between FDI and corruption using firm 
level data on Swedish outward investment and found that Swedish firms were less likely to invest in 
countries where corruption was prevalent.  In a cross country study of the relationship between FDI 
and institutional quality, including corruption, Bénassy‐Quéré et al (2007) found good institutions to 
have a positive effect on FDI.  Finally, in an African study of Ugandan firms, Fisman and Svensson 
(2007) found a robust and statistically significant negative relationship between corruption and firm 
growth.  However, this study did not specifically address foreign firms or inward investment but it 
does lend support to the view that corruption tends to reduce the attractiveness of a particular location 
to international investors.  However, there is some evidence that corruption has positive effects on 
FDI and a small number of authors have reported this.  In a country level study, Egger and Winner 
(2005) found a positive and statistically significant relationship between FDI and corruption.  
Similarly, Pantzalis et al (2008) used a sample of US owned MNEs and found that corruption tends to 
increase the gains from foreign investment in locations where the quality of governance is poor.   
A small number of studies follow the arguments proposed in this paper and consider the 
impact of foreign investment on corruption rather than the reverse.  Rose-Ackerman (2002) provides a 
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clear argument that affiliates of multinationals have an obligation to not engage in corruption in 
countries in which they do business. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) consider whether MNEs might 
themselves affect levels of corruption in host countries. In a cross-country study of the relationship 
between FDI and corruption they find that MNEs do tend to restrain corruption.  Equally, Larraín and 
Tavares (2004), in a country level study find that FDI is associated with lower levels of corruption, 
that is, FDI as a share of GDP tends to result in lower levels of corruption. This supports the view that 
spillover effects of good governance can result from FDI firms and good practices can be learned by 
domestic firms in the host country.  
Swamy et al (2001) analyse the relationship between gender and corruption in a multi-country 
study combined with a micro-level study of Georgia. They find women to be less prone to corruption 
and countries in which women hold power to be less corrupt.  They include a dummy variable for 
foreign ownership in their micro-level probit analysis of corruption in Georgia and find no statistically 
significant effect. Chen et al (2008) conducted a multi-country analysis of the micro and macro level 
determinants of corruption, finding that macro-level variables and, in particular, the bargaining power 
of firms to be important.  Their logit regression model includes a dummy variable for foreign 
ownership, which they find to be statistically insignificant.  Reinikka and Svensson (2006) provide a 
valuable discussion of the measurement of corruption, concluding that enterprise surveys and public 
expenditure tracking surveys to be useful methods.  
Hunt and Laszlo (2012), in a study of Uganda and Peru, find that the burden of bribery is not 
borne disproportionately by the poor.  Okada and Samreth (2012) used country level data to analyse 
the effects of foreign aid on corruption, finding multi-lateral but not bi-lateral aid to be associated 
with higher levels of corruption. Liu et al (2016) in a study of China show that, with decentralisation 
of government, bribery can be important at the local rather than national level and can vary according 
to the control rights of local officials.  An interesting study of traffic violations and corruption in 
Moscow by Mironov (2015) found that firms with corrupt CEOs performed better than other firms in 
terms of revenue growth. 
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A further possibility is that foreign firms have a neutral effect on corruption.  That is, they 
simply adapt to local conditions and if corruption is the norm, they follow suit if that is established 
practice, despite possible consequences from their home country.  Puck et al (2013) find that foreign 
firms operating in emerging markets shape their strategies to address location specific risks and adapt 
accordingly, if necessary following custom and practice.  Since their analysis includes measures of 
corruption it would be reasonable to suppose that this adaptation to local conditions also encompasses 
practices with respect to bribery.  Roy and Goll (2014) examine the influence of national culture on 
control of corruption and find this to be linked to indigenous characteristics.  This would also imply 
that foreign firms adapt to, rather than to shape, local culture.  Svensson (2003) uses firm level data 
for Uganda to analyse the determinants of corruption, finding variation by industry according to the 
firm’s ability to pay and available alternatives. 
Thus, in summary, so far as it considers the effects of foreign firms on bribery, the literature 
offers two main competing views.  Some authors find that foreign firms help reduce corruption but the 
implications of the work of others is that they simply adapt to local conditions. Clearly, any study of 
corruption at the firm level is limited as such practices are generally illegal and certainly unethical and 
so data are not easy to find and the number of empirical papers is not extensive.  Fortunately, the 
World Bank Enterprise Surveys do include some information on the extent to which corruption is 
evident and therefore it is possible to discriminate between these two views in the literature.  
Therefore, the first testable hypothesis is that firms adapt to local corruption rather than changing it, 
notwithstanding legal and political pressures in their home country.  
Hypothesis 1: foreign firms in emerging markets are equally likely to pay bribes as local firms. 
It is also possible that corruption influences the type of foreign ownership of the firm.  Early 
work on these issues, such as Gomes-Carreres (1989) and (1990), emphasised the influence of 
transactions costs on the choice of joint ventures over other forms of foreign ownership. Corruption in 
this respect would serve to increase transactions costs and create a disposition towards joint ventures. 
In particular, it may induce a preference for joint ventures over a controlling interest in a local 
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affiliate.  In a firm level study of Vietnam, Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012) found that ownership 
mattered and that corrupt practices tended to favour state owned enterprises over privately owned 
firms. Furthermore, in an analysis of inward investment in Turkey, Tekin-Koru (2006) found that 
countries with similar levels of corruption in their domestic market tended to focus on joint ventures 
while in contrast, investment from countries with dissimilar levels of corruption in their domestic 
market tended to focus on ownership of subsidiaries.  Smarzynska and Wei (2001) used firm level 
data from transition economies and found that corruption tends to increase the preference of foreign 
investors to work with a local partner through a joint venture relative to acquiring a controlling 
interest in an affiliate.  Javorcik and Wei (2009) used a probit model to analyse investment in 
transitional countries, focussing on both the decision to invest in a particular location and the choice 
of entry mode into a foreign market.  They found that the presence of corruption increases the 
tendency for investment to take place through joint ventures.  Chen and Hennart (2002) found 
Japanese firms investing in the US more likely to choose joint ventures in the presence of market 
barriers.  In a study of foreign affiliates of Japanese firms, Makino and Neupert (2000) found 
institutional forces to be an important determinant of the selection of a joint venture over other forms 
of direct investment. From this literature, it is reasonable to propose that the relationship between the 
payment of bribes by foreign owned firms in any particular location depends on the degree of foreign 
ownership of the firm. That is, following Smarzynska and Wei (2001) and Javorcik and Wei (2009), 
we expect a difference in behaviour between joint ventures and foreign controlled firms with respect 
to corruption. This leads to the second testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: the propensity to pay bribes is different between firms with low levels of foreign 
ownership (joint ventures) and those with higher (controlling) levels of foreign ownership. 
Barbopoulos et al (2014) find that high levels of corruption in emerging markets had a 
positive effect on shareholder wealth for UK firms making resource seeking investments. They 
attribute these effects to a similar process to that described by a number of authors.  That is, 
corruption may actually make a positive contribution by allowing firms to by-pass excessive 
bureaucracy where it exists. This is examined by Méon and Weill (2010), who showed that in a 
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sample of developed and developing countries levels of efficiency increased following corrupt 
behaviour where the institutions were ineffective.  Wang and You (2012) examined the effects of 
corruption on firm growth in China and find that firms exhibit high growth rates despite extensive 
corruption. They attributed this effect to the ability of corruption to circumvent awkward bureaucracy. 
Gaviria, (2002) also found corruption and bureaucratic obstacles to be positively and closely related in 
a study of private firms in Latin America.  Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) used country level data to 
examine the relationship between economic growth and corruption and found evidence of the 
existence of an optimal level of corruption. They also found that high levels of corruption reduced 
economic growth but more moderate levels actually appeared to enhance it.  Yet again the explanation 
offered was that bribes allowed firms to avoid adverse government policies or practices, which were 
costly in terms of senior management time and the effort required to understand complex regulations. 
This leads to two related testable hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3:  the payment of bribes by firms is positively related to the extent of bureaucratic 
obstacles. 
In empirical studies of bribery the role of the state in the host country is a common theme.  
Two factors are notable.  The first in the frequency of bribes related to the procurement of 
government contracts.  Nwabuz (2005) discusses the bribery of public officials by multinational firms 
to secure state patronage and increase the likelihood of their acquiring government contracts.  This is 
particularly the case for foreign firms as their lower cost of capital compared to domestic firms can 
increase their ability to pay bribes and this reduces the number of domestic bidders (Evernett and 
Hoekman, 2001).  Further, in a study of the effectiveness of The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating International Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Hamra (2000) found that kickbacks are 
necessary to win government contracts “in many parts of the world (p.44).  This leads to a fourth 
testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4:  the payment of bribes by firms is positively related to the procurement of government 
contracts. 
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The second factor that recurs frequently in the corruption literature is the effect of political 
instability in the host country.  Corruption of various types is more likely to thrive where there is 
unstable government as well as the existence of poor quality institutions (Mauro, 1995).   This leads 
to the final testable hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5:  the payment of bribes by firms is positively related to political stability and other 
aspects of civil society in the host country. 
Although this analysis focuses heavily on foreign ownership, bureaucratic obstacles, the 
pursuit of government contracts and political stability, other factors may also influence the propensity 
of firms to pay bribes. Thus, several variables are used to control for possible effects.  These are: the 
age (Olney, 2014) and size of firm (Harstad and SvenssenJ, 2011), the extent to which the firm 
exports (Olney, 2014) and the market structure faced by the firm (Rose-Ackerman 1975).     
3. Data 
3.1 Data Sources 
This study uses data from various World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) 1.  Details of these surveys 
can be found at: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. These surveys are not conducted annually but at 
irregular intervals, often on different years for different countries. For example, Argentina was 
surveyed in 2006 and 2010 but China in 2005 and 2012.  This restricts the number of countries that 
can be combined into a single cross-section. Even for a single country the data cannot normally be 
used as a panel. When a survey of the same country is repeated in a later year only a very small 
proportion of firms are included in both surveys. For example, Turkey was surveyed in 2009 and 
2013.  The 2009 survey of Turkey covered 1152 enterprises and the 2013 survey 1344 enterprises. Of 
these only 138 firms (10% of the 2013 sample) appeared in both years. Since the survey of any one 
country in any one year contains predominantly different firms to the survey of the same country in a 
                                                          
1 These surveys have been used extensively (see, for example, Dethier et al (2011) and Xu (2011) for surveys 
and Clarke (2011) and Jensen et al (2010) and Olney (2014) for studies on corruption). 
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different year it is only possible to develop a sample of true panel data at the cost of the great majority 
of observations.  
Thus, the nature of the data restricts analysis to cross-section but this study analyses two 
different cross-sections. Sample 1 comprises 41 countries from all major world regions surveyed in 
the period 2009-2010.  A full list of the countries included and the number of observations from each 
is presented in Appendix 1. Sample 2 covers the period 2013-2015 but excludes Latin American 
countries, for which there were (at the time of writing) no surveys after 2010.  Since the two cross-
sections do not comprise the same firms they cannot be formally compared but they do allow a means 
to assess whether key conclusions are valid in more than one time period. This provides some sense of 
behavioural consistency over time. 
Appendix 1 presents details of the country composition of sample 1 (26,505 observations) and 
of sample 2 (23,194 observations). Appendix 2 presents a summary by sector of selected 
characteristics of sample 1 and Appendix 3 presents similar details for sample 2.  A key feature of 
both samples is the heterogeneity of firms.  The size of firms included in both samples varies 
considerably from a single owner (0 employees) to almost 38,000 workers in sample 1 and to 17,000 
in sample 2.  Both appendices show important variations between sectors in foreign ownership, 
exporting and in perceptions of key constraints.  With two samples as diverse as these it is necessary 
to take firm heterogeneity into account.  It should be noted that our sample includes only the firms 
surveyed. This creates the possibility that there exists sample selection bias, for example from the 
exclusion of firms that ceased trading or from the exclusion of foreign investors who were deterred by 
corruption.  The data used also included a number of country level variables, which were taken from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
3.2 Bribery Variable 
The WBES data include two sets of variables dealing with corruption.  There are a number of 
questions relating to perceptions of corruption and a number of other questions relating to whether an 
individual firm actually paid a bribe or not.  In the literature much research, for example Swamy et al 
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(2001), focused on the act of bribery rather than upon perceptions.  This study follows the same 
tradition but we do use perceptions of corruption as an explanatory variable (testing the proposition 
that an act of bribery is more likely if a firm considers corruption commonplace).   
The questions related to bribery from the standardised part of WBES questionnaires are 
outlined in Appendix 4.  Our dependent (outcome) variable is the variable bribe, which takes the 
value of 1 when the firm responds with a positive value of informal payments with respect to customs, 
taxes, regulations and the like in the current year and 0 for no payment.  The full text of the relevant 
question is given in Appendix 4 as are the other (unused) questions relating to payment of bribes. 
Information on bribery is necessarily sensitive and is exposed to some risk of response bias.  
WBES data is obtained from confidential surveys conducted independently from national 
governments. For all questions in the surveys responding firms have two options to not respond to a 
particular question – a blank entry or a “don’t know” response.  Appendix 4 shows that for all 
questions in our sample (sample 1 and sample 2 combined) about 38% of responses were blank 
entries and about 1% were “don’t knows”.  The percentages for both blank entries and “don’t knows” 
are also given for a number of selected questions for comparison.  For the question used there was an 
unusually low proportion of blank responses (1.2%) but a much higher proportion of “don’t know” 
responses (about 10%).  For the questions relating to bribery responding firms were given an 
additional option of “refuse to answer”.  About 7% of responding firms refused to answer. No 
measure of bribery is ever likely to be wholly free of mis-reporting.  It is certainly possible that firms 
refusing to answer the question do so to avoid incrimination. Nonetheless, the use of the WBES 
survey and the selection of the particular question offers some reassurance that firms that did respond 
were not particularly likely to mis-report when alternative responses where available. 
Appendix 5 presents details of response rates to the same question by country.  
Unsurprisingly, this reveals substantial differences between countries of firms reporting payment of 
bribes. It underlines the need to include variables to capture country differences, particularly with 
respect to governance. 
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 3.3 Foreign Ownership Variables 
For foreign ownership we followed Lu et al (2010) and Kimura and Kiyota (2007) and used equity 
share as a measure of foreign ownership. Thus, foreign ownership is defined as the presence of any 
foreign equity in the enterprise. It is more difficult to define a joint venture.  Hennart and Zeng (2005) 
provide the most commonly used definition, that is, a joint venture is a partnership between firms, and 
they discuss the essential features of such a partnership.  Boersma et al (2003) emphasise the 
importance of relationship trust in joint ventures. Based on such arguments we consider two different 
types of (0,1) measure based on equity share as a proxy for the degree of trust likely to be required. 
These were defined as: 
• foreign1 - 1 for any foreign ownership, 0 otherwise 
• foreign3 - 1 for 50% or more foreign ownership, 0 otherwise. 
A separate question in the WBES data asks the firm whether or not it is a joint venture with a foreign 
partner.  The (0,1) variable jointvent takes the value of 1 for a positive response and 0 otherwise.  For 
conciseness we use only the foreign1 variable in the probit and IWPRA analyses. All three foreign 
ownership variables are used in the propensity score matching analysis. 
3.4 Firm level control variables 
Following the finding by Swamy et al (2001) that females are less likely to engage in corruption we 
defined two variables for female participation in the firm: 
• femown (0,1) takes on the value of 1 if some owners of the firm are female, 
• femman (0,1) takes on the value of 1 if the senior manager of the firm is female. 
A number of authors, such as Svensson (2003), link the payment of bribes to the firm’s ability 
to pay. Mironov (2015) found that firms with corrupt CEOs performed better. To capture the link 
between firm performance and bribery effects we included the following variables:  
• spw – sales per worker (current US $) 
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• ppw – profit per worker (current US $) 
• growth – the percentage growth in turnover relative to 3 years earlier, following the analysis 
linking growth and corruption by  Fisman and Svensson (2007). 
• export – the share of exports in total sales. This is a performance variable since an extensive 
literature suggests that only better performing firms export. 
Other authors, for example Méon and Weill (2010), have linked the payment of bribes to 
overcoming obstacles faced by firms and the WBES questionnaire includes a number of questions 
related to this. Each are scored from 0 (no obstacle) to 4 (very severe obstacle).  For conciseness we 
grouped a number of these into the following measures: 
• infra reflects perceived infrastructure constraints. It is defined as the mean (0-4) score for the 
importance of obstacles arising from each of electricity, telecommunications and transport. 
• burcy represents perceived constraints arising from day to day governance.  It is defined as 
the mean score for each of customs, tax administration, business licensing and labour 
regulation. 
• polity is derived from perceived constraints arising from civil society. This variable is the 
mean score of responses to each of crime, political instability, corruption and the courts. 
The remaining firm level control variables comprised: 
• size, the firm’s size class from micro to large, reflecting the argument by Chen et al (2008) 
that bargaining power is important in understanding bribery. 
• govtbid, (0,1) takes the value of 1 if the firm had bid for a government contract over the most 
recent 3 years. 
• local a (0,1) variable, taking on the value of 1 where the firm’s main market is local and 
national another (0,1) variable where the firm’s main market is national. These variables are 
based on the finding by Liu et al (2016) that bribery is often local. 
• age, the age of the firm in years. This acts as a proxy for experience and learning by doing. 
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• mgrexp, the number of years of experience of the firm’s senior manager, also intended to 
capture learning by doing. 
• degree, the proportion of workers with university degrees. A number of previous studies have 
suggested that highly educated workers are less likely to be corrupt. 
3.5 Country level variables 
The role of the country level variables is to capture the most important differences in behaviour 
specific to individual countries. The following variables were included; 
• gdpcap - GDP per capita, following the finding by authors such as Mauro (1995) of the link 
between GDP per capita and corruption. 
• regeff – regulatory efficiency (distance to frontier score 0-100).  A number of authors, 
including Globerman and Shapiro (2002), have linked corruption to regulatory inefficiency. 
• edsecon and edtertiary – enrolment ratios in secondary and tertiary education. Again 
capturing the effects of education on corruption. 
• enterprise – new business registrations per 1000 persons. A number of authors such as Roy 
and Goll (2014) emphasise the role of local business culture in corruption. 
• natresrents – natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP. 
• tradeopen – openness to trade, measured by international trade as a percentage of GDP. Trade 
reduces market and, hence, bargaining power for domestic firms. 
4. Methodology 
4.1  Probit fixed effects model 
The first part of the analysis uses a probit fixed effects model, common with previous studies of 
corruption (see, for example, Swamy et al, 2001). Details of the functional form and its limitations are 
in Baltagi (2008). The initial specification was a standard probit model such that: 
 Pr(bribe=1) = F( X’β)        (1) 
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where Pr(bribe=1) is the probability that the (0,1) variable bribe takes on the value of 1 (the firm paid 
a bribe), F is the cumulative standard normal distribution, X is the vector of explanatory variables and 
β the vector of coefficients to be estimated.    
 Although the sample is cross-section rather than panel it was considered it important to 
control for the possibility that one industry might be more prone to bribery than another or more 
affected by cumbersome bureaucracy. To capture these influences industry fixed effects was included 
in the model. The resulting model is expressed: 
 Pr(bribe=1) = F( X’β + γ)       (2) 
where γ is a vector of  industry dummy variables.   
The literature raises concerns about potential bias affecting average coefficients in the probit 
model when fixed effects are used (see Green, 2004 and Fernández-Val, 2009). These issues are 
generally considered to have much less consequence for marginal coefficients. Accordingly, marginal 
rather than average coefficients are reported.   
4.2 Instrumental Variables Probit Model 
As discussed in the review of literature an extensive body of work exists that sees the presence of 
corruption as a deterrent to inward foreign direct investment. A small but growing literature, of which 
this study is intended to contribute, considers the possibility that foreign ownership might itself 
change the incidence of corruption.  This implies a dual causality – that corruption affects inward 
investment but inward investment also affects corruption. An important consequence of this is that the 
probit estimates may be biased and inconsistent. To address this, an instrumental variables version of 
the probit model (probit model with continuous endogenous regressors) was used.  This model 
essentially adapts and extends the probit model to allow for one or more endogenous regressors.   
The probit instrumental variables (probit IV) model retains the key features of a standard IV 
model. Instruments are required to be (a) related to the relevant independent variable(s) (the 
instrument is informative) and (b) uncorrelated with the (unobserved) disturbance term (the 
instrument is valid). As with standard IV estimation it is necessary to test for weak instruments.  For 
estimation the ivprobit command in stata14 was used with weakiv to test for weak instruments.  The 
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ivprobit routine allows for two different estimation techniques – a maximum likelihood and a two-
step estimator.  The latter approach was used as weakiv is only appropriate with the two-step 
estimatior. For a more detailed exposition of these techniques readers are referred to Wooldridge 
(2010).   
For the estimation of the probit IV model two further variables were added.  The model is 
only appropriate when the variable that is instrumented is continuous. To satisfy this condition the 
(0,1) variable foreign1  was replaced with the continuous variable foreign (the share of the firm 
owned by private foreign entities).  As an instrument for the endogenous variable foreign the variable 
licensing was used.  This variable takes the value of 1 if the firm was using technology licensed from 
a foreign company (other than computer software) and 0 otherwise.  The theory of FDI focuses on the 
exploitation of ownership advantages in the form of know-how in foreign locations.  This provides a 
conceptual basis for an association between foreign ownership and payments for intellectual property 
(the informative property of the instrument).  The firm-level decision to license foreign technology is 
part of the firm’s supply decision making and unlikely to be related to either demand side firm level 
decisions (for example, which markets to sell to) or to country wide variables.  In short, as an 
instrument the variable licensing is valid.       
4.3 Propensity score matching 
In common with any statistical model the probit specification has limitations.  A particular area of 
concern in this study is that it does not allow sufficiently for heterogeneity of firms.  That is, it 
imposes the same behavioural model on all firms irrespective of whether they are similar to each other 
or not.  To provide a better examination of the hypotheses, matching techniques are used to ensure 
closer comparability between those firms that pay bribes with those that do not. As noted by Mallick 
et al (2013) propensity score matching reduces sample selection bias by creating a carefully matched 
control group.  As they note this is particularly useful where selection bias arises from endogeneity,  
for example when both foreign ownership and bribes are co-determined.   Borin and Mancini (2016) 
also advocate the use of propensity score matching to address sample selection bias, It is not possible 
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to observe the same firm in two different scenarios (say with or without foreign ownership) but it is 
possible to create a counter-factual using a company with very similar characteristics in all respects 
other than foreign ownership.  These properties make propensity score matching a particularly useful 
method for analysing our data. 
The central feature of matching analysis is the relationship between a treatment variable and 
an outcome variable.  In this study the treatment variable is foreign ownership (defined in three 
different ways) and the outcome variable indicates whether the firm pays a bribe or not. A simple 
approach would be to compare a sample of foreign owned firms with a sample of other firms and test 
whether there is a statistically significant difference in the payment of bribes between the two.  
Unfortunately such an approach would almost certainly produce biased results unless the treated and 
control groups closely resemble each other in all relevant attributes other than the treatment. The 
selection of a control group that satisfies these conditions is known as a matching approach. It seeks 
to replicate the process of experimental random sampling using non-experimental observed data.2 
The standard matching approach considers three key parameters: 
• ATE – the average treatment effect in the population (defined as all treated and untreated 
firms or individuals). 
• ATT – the average treatment effect for treated firms (foreign owned firms in this paper) 
• ATNT – the average treatment effect for untreated firms (firms that are not foreign owned). 
These are defined as: 
 ATE = E(Y1i – Y0i) ≡ E(βi)       (3) 
 ATT = E(Y1i – Y0i| Di = 1) ≡ E(βi|Di = 1)     (4) 
 ATNT = E(Y1i – Y0i| Di = 0) ≡ E(βi|Di = 0)     (5) 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed exposition of matching techniques see Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and Deheja (2005) and 
for applications see Sianesi (2004) and Blundell et al (2005). 
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where Y is the outcome (payment of a bribe), with subscript 1 for those firms that are treated and 
subscript 0 for those that are not. D is an indicator of the treatment received (by definition 1 for 
treated (foreign owned) and 0 for untreated). 
As discussed above the simplest estimator of the effects of treatment (foreign ownership) on 
the outcome (payment of a bribe) is simply to compare the means of the treated (foreign owned) firms 
with the untreated (domestic). However, such an approach is biased, which results from two possible 
sources:  bias from selection on observables (comparing firms that are not comparable or weighting 
comparable individuals differently) and bias from selection on unobservable variables.  The latter is a 
version of the problem of possible excluded confounding variables or omitted variable bias.  It is 
never certain that an important confounding variable has not been excluded but it is important to 
demonstrate that steps have been taken to reduce this risk.  In this study the most common approach is 
used, that is to include potentially relevant variables for which observable data are used.  For example, 
here selected variables include firm size, a measure of bureaucratic obstacles, industry dummies and 
others. 
Reducing bias from selection on observables requires a more complex explanation. To 
estimate ATT it is necessary to assume that all relevant differences are captured in the observed 
attributes of the treated and untreated firms.  That is, that no bias from selection on unobservables is 
present and that both treated and untreated firms are observed to have shared attributes.  Selection is 
performed using a propensity score p(x) where: 
 p(x) ≡ P(D=1|X=x) = E(D|X=x)       (6) 
The most common approach uses a probit model to define the propensity score and this is 
followed here.  Unlike the model discussed earlier this probit model is not intended to be itself a 
causal model.  It acts as a way of identifying and summarising the key characteristics of the treated 
(foreign owned) firms.  The next step is to match each treated (foreign owned) firm with a 
comparable untreated (domestic) firm.  There are many different ways in which this matching can be 
done. The most common is to select comparison firms according to the nearest neighbour principle. 
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For each foreign firm this involves selecting an untreated (domestic) firm with the closest value of the 
propensity score. The matching procedure used here was nearest neighbour sampling with 
replacement. Other methods of matching, including several using kernel densities, were also used. 
Kernel density matching with bootstrapped standard errors was used for this study.   
The final step in the matching process is to assess how effective the process of matching was 
in selecting a control group from the untreated (domestic) firms that was comparable to the treated 
(foreign owned) group. In effect this is a check on the adequacy of the process of selecting 
observables and are not formal statistical tests but checks using descriptive statistics.  These checks 
are reported in appendix 5 for sample 1 and appendix 6 for sample 2. 
There are two key assumptions of the matching estimator that require further consideration. 
The first is that there is no bias on unobservables.  As with omitted variable bias in the regression 
model there is no certain method to eliminate the risk that an unobservable variable has resulted in 
bias. We have sought to reduce this risk by including as many variables as possible as observables.  In 
developing propensity scores we used not only the control variables listed earlier but dummy 
variables for each sector. The second important assumption is that the treatment variable, foreign 
ownership, is exogenous. To address potential endogeneity of the treatment variable this study used a 
further estimator. 
4.4 Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) 
As noted previously propensity score matching estimators help reduce sample selection bias arising 
from endogeneity.  Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) takes this one step 
further by explicitly modelling treatment effects as endogenous variables.  The IPWRA technique is 
set out in detail in Cattaneo (2010) and Cattaneo et al (2013).  IPWRA can also be seen as an 
extension of the matching approach to include interactions with another treatment variable. For 
example, it allows estimation of treatment effects of, say, foreign ownership and bureaucracy and the 
interaction between the two variables.  
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To take into account that bureaucracy and foreign ownership simultaneously influence firm 
behaviour, we estimate treatment effects in the multi-treatment context. A matching approach with 
multiple treatments was first introduced by Lechner (2001). We have M+1 treatments, the M original 
treatments plus a joint effect of the M treatments combined. The model is also estimated with no 
treatment effects – see Czarnitzki et al.,(2007) and Radicic and Pugh (2016). The average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) effect is then calculated as: 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑚|𝐴 = 𝑚) − (𝑌𝑙|𝐴 = 𝑚) (7) 
where m denotes the treatment level, l represents the comparison group (the treatment level to which 
m is compared) and Ym and Yl denote outcomes in states m and l respectively.  
The main attraction of the IPWRA estimator is its property of double robustness. Double 
robustness implies that either the treatment model or the outcome model (or both) have to be correctly 
specified for the estimator to produce consistent treatment effects (Hirano et al. 2003). That is, 
provided either the model of the treatment or the model of the outcome is correctly specified the 
model will result in estimates of treatment effects with a lower bias than other estimators. The Monte 
Carlo analysis of Busso et al. (2014) supports the use of the IPWRA estimator.  
The IPWRA estimator consists of three steps. The first of these is to estimate the propensity 
score for the treatment model. This, for example, provides estimates of the probability that a firm is 
foreign owned. Propensity scores are estimated by a multinomial logit model, incorporating all four 
treatment levels: neither bureaucratic constraints nor foreign ownership; only bureaucratic constraints; 
only foreign ownership; and both. The propensity scores enable firms to be matched within each 
treatment level. The second step is to estimate a series of regressions in which the inverse of the 
estimated propensity scores are used as weights on covariates X and our treatment dummies. The final 
step is to compute the ATT effect, that is, the difference in the weighted averages of the predicted 
outcomes (for technical details see Wooldridge 2010). This three-step approach provides consistent 
estimates given the underlying assumption of the independence of the treatment from the predicted 
outcomes once covariates are modelled in steps 1 and 2. The standard errors reported are of the 
Huber/White/sandwich type that take into account that the estimates are computed in a three-step 
approach (Emsley et al. 2008). 
24 
 
5. Estimation and Results 
5.1 Probit Analysis 
The results of the probit analysis are in Table 1, where the coefficients are the marginal effects 
(dF/dx) rather than averages because country dummy variables were used in estimation. Coefficients 
for country dummies are not reported.  Note also that the software used (STATA 14) automatically 
deletes observations for which there are missing observations.  This creates a difference in the number 
of observations between the general and specific version of models as removing variables reduces 
missing observations. Results are reported for sample 1 (2009-10) and for sample 2 (2013-2015), in 
each case for a general (all variables included) and a specific (control variables that were jointly 
statistically insignificant excluded) version of the model.  Results are reported only for the foreign1 
(any foreign ownership) variable.  
Table 1 
For both sample 1 and sample 2 the coefficient for foreign ownership is statistically 
insignificant at 90% confidence levels or higher.  Hypothesis 1 (that foreign ownership has no effect 
on the propensity to pay bribes) cannot be rejected.  In both sample 1 and sample 2 the coefficient for 
perceived (by the firm) bureaucratic obstacles is positive and statistically significant at 99% 
confidence.  In consequence, hypothesis 3 (that bribery is related to bureaucratic constraints) also 
cannot be rejected.  With respect to the relationship between bribery and perceived constraints from 
civil society – polity (encompassing political instability, perceived corruption, crime and the courts) – 
the results differ between sample 1 and sample 2.  Whether or not the firm had sought government 
contracts was a statistically significant determinant of bribery in both samples (at 99% for sample 1 
but only at 90% for sample 2).  These findings are such that hypothesis 4 (that bribery is positively 
related to government contracts) cannot be rejected. For sample 1 the coefficient for polity is 
statistically insignificant at 90% or higher confidence levels. For sample 2 it is statistically significant 
at 99% and positive.  Hypothesis 5 (that constraints related to polity are positively associated with 
bribery) cannot be rejected for sample 2 but is rejected for sample 1. 
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With respect to other control variables, GDP per capita was found to have a statistically 
significant and negative effect on bribes at 99% confidence in both samples.  This finding is 
consistent with the view that bribery is less prevalent in higher per capita income countries.  A 
number of other control variables were significant in one sample but not the other. For example, 
infrastructure obstacles and trade openness were found to have positive and statistically significant 
effects on bribes in one sample but not the other. 
5.2 Probit with a Continuous Endogenous Regressor (Instrumental Variables) 
The results of the instrumental variables (IV) version of the probit model are in Table 2.  Note that the 
IV version of the probit model requires the endogenous regressor to be continuous.  For this analysis 
the variable foreign (the percentage foreign ownership of the firm) replaced the (0,1) variable 
foreign1.  The variable licensing (whether or not the firm uses foreign technology under licence) was 
used as an instrument for foreign. Tests for weak instruments suggest that the hypothesis that 
licensing is a weak instrument for foreign can also be rejected for any reasonable level of confidence.  
Table 2 
Table 2 reports only the “specific” version of the IV probit model.  The model was initially 
run with the full set of variables listed in Table 1 but the specifications reported are those with 
(jointly) statistically insignificant variables omitted.  With respect to the foreign ownership variable 
the findings are consistent with the earlier probit model. For both sample 1 and sample 2, foreign 
ownership was found to have no statistically significant effect on whether or not firms paid a bribe.   
With respect to other potential determinants of bribery the main findings of the IV probit model were: 
• larger firms (variable size) were statistically significantly less likely to report having paid a 
bribe in both sample 1 and sample 2 
• perceived bureaucratic obstacles (burcy)  were statistically significantly more likely to result 
in a reported bribe in both samples. 
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• perceived obstacles arising from the political and legal environment (polity) were also 
statistically significantly more likely to result in reported bribery in sample 1 and in sample 2. 
• of the country level variables per capita GDP and secondary school enrolment ratios  were 
found to be statistically significantly associated with a lower propensity to bribe in both 
samples. 
• natural resource rents (as a share of GDP) and (perversely) tertiary education enrolment ratios 
were found to have statistically significant effects of increasing reported bribery. 
5.3 Matching Analysis 
To construct the propensity score we used probit models for each of the three (0,1) foreign ownership 
variables, that is, foreign1 (any foreign ownership), foreign3 (majority foreign ownership) and  
jointvent (joint venture). In the first instance all control variables (see section 3) were used to estimate 
the probit model and sector dummies were also included.  The final propensity score was created after 
removing those variables that were jointly insignificant from the probit models. Note that these 
estimates were not intended as a behavioural model of foreign ownership in the way that the probit 
model in the preceding section examined the determinants of bribery. The purpose of the probit 
analysis in this case was to identify the key characteristics of foreign owned firms so that a closely 
matched control group could be selected to provide a propensity score.3  These were then used to 
create matched control groups using the psmatch2 application in STATA statistical software (see 
Leuven and Sianesi (2012) for details).  
There are several different ways of matching using a propensity score. The analysis presented 
here used kernel density matching with bootstrapped standard errors. Table 3 reports the results for 
sample 1 (2009-10). Tests were conducted for each variable relating to our five hypotheses.  Checks 
for bias on observables are reported in Appendix 6. The results show that neither any foreign 
ownership (foreign1) nor majority foreign ownership (foreign3) had any statistically significant effect 
on the payment of bribes by firms in sample 1 (2009-10).  The (0,1) variable for joint ventures did 
                                                          
3 The results of these probit regressions are not reported but are available from the authors.   
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reveal a positive and statistically significant effect on the payment of bribes but only at 90% 
confidence.  In consequence, hypothesis 1 (foreign ownership does not affect bribery) cannot be 
rejected for foreign ownership in general. Hypothesis 2 is also not rejected, as the (marginally) 
statistically significant positive effect for joint ventures reveals a behavioural difference from other 
forms of foreign ownership. 
Table 3 
The bureaucracy variable was re-defined as a 0,1 variable taking on the value of 1 if the firm 
reported a mean score of 2 (moderate difficulty) or higher.  The results showed perceived bureaucratic 
obstacles to have a positive and statistically significant effect (at 99%) on bribery. Hypothesis 3 was 
accordingly not rejected.  Likewise whether or not the firm had bid for a government contract was 
positive and statistically significant at 99% confidence, such that hypothesis 4 (that bids for 
government work are positively associated with bribery) was also not rejected.  Finally the variable 
polity (capturing perceptions of political instability, crime, corruption and the courts) was found to 
have a statistically significant effect on bribery. 
Table 4 presents comparable results of the matching analysis for sample 2 (2013-15).  Checks 
for bias on observables are in Appendix 7. With respect to foreign ownership there is one conclusion 
that differs from the findings for the earlier sample.  The effect of joint ventures on bribery 
(significant only at 90% confidence in sample 1) is not statistically significant.  For the later sample 
no form of foreign ownership has a statistically significant effect (at 90% confidence or higher) on 
bribery; foreign1, foreign3 and jointvent are all statistically insignificant.  This means that neither 
hypothesis 1 (foreign firms do not differ from others with respect to bribery) nor hypothesis 2 (the 
form of foreign ownership does not affect the propensity to bribe) can be rejected.  As with the earlier 
sample perceived bureaucratic obstacles have a statistically significant effect (at 99%) on the payment 
of bribes, such that hypothesis 3 (a positive relationship between bureaucracy and briber) also cannot 
be rejected.  As with sample 1 there are statistically significant and positive effects for (a) bidding for 
government contracts (at 95%) and for (b) polity (perceived constraints from political instability, 
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crime, corruption and the courts), at 99% confidence.  In consequence, neither hypothesis 4 (that 
bribery is positively related to government procurement) nor hypothesis 5 (that bribery is positively 
related to perceptions of obstacles arising from civil society) can be rejected. 
Table 4 
The key features of the propensity score matching analysis are that all types of foreign 
ownership (any, majority or joint venture) have no statistically significant effects on bribery when 
sample selection bias is controlled by a matching procedure. The only exception was that joint 
ventures were found to be marginally significant (at 90%) in sample 1.  Bureaucracy, bidding for 
government contracts and perceived obstacles caused by political instability, corruption, crime and the 
courts (polity) were all found to have a statistically significant effect of increasing bribery in both 
sample 1 and sample 2. 
5.3 Inverse Probability Weighted Regression Adjustment (IPWRA) Analysis 
The IPWRA represents a number of important extensions to the matching model. It makes treatment 
effects endogenous to the model, allows interactions between two different treatment effects and, 
most importantly, it has the property of double robustness.  In this section the analysis focuses on the 
effects of foreign ownership on bribery jointly with a series of partner treatments: bureaucracy 
(burcy), perceived obstacles arising from political instability, crime, corruption and the courts (polity) 
and bidding for government contracts (govtbid).   
Table 5 presents the results of the IPWRA analysis for sample 1. The table is divided into 
three sections Reading across the first row of the first section gives the estimated treatment effects 
(ATT) for foreign1, bureaucracy and both treatments jointly compared to the counter-factual of no 
treatment.  Foreign ownership (foreign1) has no statistically significant effect but bureaucracy has a 
positive and statistically significant effect (at 99%) on the payment of bribes. The combined effect of 
both foreign ownership and bureaucracy is also positive and statistically significant but the table 
shows that this finding is dominated by the effect of perceived bureaucratic obstacles.  Reading down 
the first column in the first section provides estimates of the ATT derived from removing rather than 
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adding a treatment effect (the double robustness property).  The removal of foreign1 as a treatment is 
shown to have no statistically significant effect but the removal of perceived bureaucracy has a 
statistically significant (99%) negative effect on bribery, that is, removing burcy as a treatment 
reduces bribery.  The combined effect of removing both foreign ownership and bureaucracy is also 
negative and statistically significant at 99% confidence. Again this finding is dominated by the effect 
of bureaucracy. 
Table 5 
The second section of Table 5 presents the IPWRA estimates using foreign ownership and 
polity (perceived constraints from political instability, crime, corruption and the courts) as treatments. 
Reading across the first row gives treatment effects compared to the counter factual of no treatment.  
Foreign ownership is found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on bribery but only at 
90% confidence. Both Polity and the combined effect of two treatments were found to have positive 
and statistically significant (at 99%) effects on bribery.  Reading down the first column of the second 
section gives the effects of removing rather than adding each treatment.  The removal of foreign 
ownership has no statistically significant effect.  This means that the conclusion that it had a 
(marginally) significant effect when added is not robust. The removal of polity as a treatment was also 
statistically insignificant, suggesting a lack of robustness with the earlier finding of a statistically 
significant effect. The third section considers foreign ownership and bidding for government contracts 
as treatment variables. Reading across the first row shows a not statistically significant treatment 
effect for foreign ownership but a positive and statistically significant (99%) effect of government 
contract bids on bribery.  Reading down the first column of the third section shows that these findings 
are robust.  The removal of foreign ownership as a treatment has no statistically significant effect but 
the removal of government bids as a treatment has a statistically significant (99%) negative effect on 
bribery. 
The final section of Table 5 presents the IPWRA analysis using foreign ownership and 
profitability per worker (ppw) as treatments.  The inclusion of a profitability indicator seeks to reflect 
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the argument that more efficient, more competitive firms have less need to resort to bribery. The 
results again suggest that neither foreign ownership nor profit per worker had statistically significant 
effects on bribery in sample 1.  
Table 6 presents the IPWRA analysis for sample 2 (2013-2015).  As with the analysis for 
sample 1 the first section considers the effects on bribery of foreign ownership (foreign1) and 
perceived bureaucracy (burcy) as treatments.  Reading across the first row of the first section shows 
no statistically significant effect of foreign ownership but a statistically significant (at 99%) of 
bureaucracy. Jointly the two treatment variables are also statistically significant.  Reading down the 
first column of the first section gives the effects of removing rather than adding treatment effects.  
The removal of foreign ownership has no statistically significant effect but the removal of 
bureaucracy has a negative and statistically significant effect (at 99%) on bribery.  The second section 
considers foreign ownership and polity as treatment effects. Reading across the first row of this 
section shows, again, no statistically significant effect of foreign ownership on bribery but a 
statistically significant effect (at 99%) of polity on bribery.  The first column of the section shows the 
removal of foreign ownership as a treatment to have no statistically significant effect but the removal 
of polity to have a statistically significant (99%) negative effect on bribery.  The final section 
considers foreign ownership and bidding for government contracts as treatment variables.  Adding 
foreign ownership (first row of the section) or removing it (first column) as a treatment has no 
statistically significant effect.  Including bids for government contracts as a treatment variable (first 
row) has a statistically significant positive effect on bribery and removing it (first column) a 
statistically significant negative effect, both at 95% confidence.  
The IPWRA analysis for sample 2 differs from that for sample 1 in one important respect. 
More profitable firms (as measured by ppw) were found to have a statistically significant negative 
effect on the payment of bribes, making more profitable firms less likely to pay bribes than less 
profitable ones. Since different samples cannot be directly compared with each other it is hard to be 
certain why the findings of sample 1 differ from those for sample 2 other than to note that this is a 
possibility for further research. 
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Table 6 
The main points that emerge from the IPWRA analysis of both sample 1 and sample 2 are that 
foreign ownership has no significant effect on bribery. These findings are robust with one exception.  
The effect of bribery, when combined with the civil society variable polity is not fully robust in 
sample 1. Bureaucracy, polity and bidding for government contracts are all found to have statistically 
significant effects associated with a greater propensity to engage in bribery.  Again these findings are 
robust in both sample 1 and sample 2 with one exception, the findings for polity in sample 1 are not 
robust. In sample 2 but not in sample 1, profitability is also found to have a statistically significant 
effect in reducing bribery. 
6. Conclusions 
6.1 Methodological Limitations 
Most estimators are subject to limitations and it is worth drawing attention to those affecting the 
techniques used in this study.  In the instrumental variables probit model the study found licensing (of 
foreign technology) to be a weakly exogenous instrument for foreign ownership but the possibility 
remains that it is not strongly exogenous. There are risks of endogeneity arising from issues related to 
confounding variables – omitted variables bias with probit, bias on unobservables with propensity 
score matching and violation of the ignorability assumption with IPWRA.  There are also risks of 
endogeneity if both foreign ownership and bribery share some common determinants.  To address 
these issues the on-line appendix reports robustness checks using a bivariate probit model. This finds 
that both bribery and foreign ownership do indeed share some determinants in common but that 
foreign ownership still does not have a statistically significant effect on whether firms pay bribes or 
not, when it is treated as an endogenous variable. 
6.2 Research Implications 
To date the literature on the effects of foreign firms on corruption in host economies is inconclusive. 
Existing studies are divided between those that argue that MNEs can bring about a reduction in 
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bribery and those that argue the firms operating in international markets adapt to local conditions and 
practices. This study provides strong support for adaptation to local standards.  It finds no difference 
in behaviour between foreign owned and domestic firms with respect to bribery in a sample of 41 
emerging economies.  This has important implications for countries with high levels of corruption 
where the institutions are weak. 
The data used for the study are taken from surveys of existing firms, thus it was never the 
intention to address whether or not investment has been deterred by corruption.  However, associated 
with the literature is an argument that corruption leads firms to prefer joint ventures over independent 
subsidiaries.  This choice is more readily modelled by evidence on existing firms since it is possible to 
observe the choices that have been made with respect to ownership structure.  No difference in the 
propensity to pay bribes with respect to the degree of foreign ownership, or whether or not the firm is 
a joint venture, was found in this sample.   
This paper did not just address the literature from the perspective of foreign investment but 
also that concerning the wider determinants of corruption.  In particular it focused on the role of three 
variables: bidding for government contracts and perceived obstacles arising from (a) bureaucracy and 
(b) civil society (political instability, corruption, crime and the courts). It finds robust evidence that all 
three variables are associated with a greater propensity for firms to pay bribes.  Although not a focus 
of this study a wider range of “controls” were also used. 
From a methodological perspective few previous studies were found in the area of 
international business or development that use matching techniques.  The results of this study 
demonstrate the potential value of these techniques for future studies of the behaviour of MNEs with 
activities in developing regions. As far as can be ascertained no previous firm level study of 
corruption has used an IPWRA approach. In particular, studies which implicitly or explicitly compare 
the behaviour of foreign firms with unmatched domestic ones (without first creating a carefully 
matched control group) are at risk of making incorrect inferences. In this study there are a number of 
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examples where spurious conclusions could have been reached if care had not been taken to ensure 
that like was compared to like.  
6.3 Implications for Policy 
The results have implications for managers of MNEs in developing countries. Along with a number of 
other studies, it is shown that MNEs must expect to adapt to local culture with respect to corruption in 
emerging markets. To date the evidence suggests that this need to adapt has tended to override 
pressure from home country legislation to avoid corrupt behaviour.  Practical as opposed to moral 
considerations have tended to dominate behaviour as opposed to rhetoric.  An important reason for 
this is that bribery tends to be more prevalent where there are significant bureaucratic obstacles and 
excessive resources are required to circumvent them, that is, where host country institutions are weak.  
Firms should therefore expect behavioural norms to favour bribery where cumbersome and time 
consuming bureaucracy exists.  As with other studies, no attempt has been made to suggest that 
bribery is a first best solution from the perspective of host economies. It clearly is not and huge 
welfare losses can result as well as providing a barrier to growth. However, the evidence is consistent 
with a view that bribery may, in some instances, be more efficient than a very burdensome 
bureaucracy. This suggests that policy measures designed to reduce corruption are only likely to be 
effective if accompanied by measures to streamline government procedures and practices affecting 
business operations. 
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Table 1:  Probit estimates, dependent variable = bribe (0,1)
Variable Label Sample 1 (2009-10) Sample 2 (2013-2015)
General Specific General Specific
    dF/dx     dF/dx     dF/dx     dF/dx
Firm level variables:
foreign ownership foreign1 0.0014647 -0.0133245 0.014442 0.0123595
(0.0241068) (0.0101307) (0.0176322) (0.0106151)
firm size class size -0.0003255 -0.0249*** -0.0152***
(0.0099629) (0.0063326) (0.0038975)
age of firm age  -0.0003877 -0.0005542*** 0.0002555
(0.0004337) (0.000211) (0.0003898)
manager experience mgrexp -0.000051 -0.0000169
(0.0007017) (0.0004239)
local markets local 0.002545 -0.0243746 0.0291*
(0.0383105) (0.0280806) (0.0154731)
national markets national 0.0050136 -0.0183832 0.0281*
(0.035424) (0.0261293) (0.0164919)
exports (% of sales) export -0.0002489 -0.0004191 0.0003**
(0.0004363) (0.000303) (0.0001522)
female owner femown -0.0180026 -0.0016191
(0.014538) (0.0084441)
female manager femman -0.0140865 -0.0018959
(0.0181427) (0.0099676)
% of workers with degrees degree -0.0000481 0.0000232
(0.0003597) (0.0001515)
sales per worker spw  -1.42E-08 -0.000000007*** -1.61E-08
(0.000000027) (0.00000000136) (0.0000000249)
profit per worker ppw  -3.06E-08 0.000000007*** 1.61E-08
(0.0000000497) (0.00000000136) (0.0000000249)
growth in sales growth 0.0000234 0.00000001*
(0.0000177) (0.00000000617)
infrastructure obstacles infra 0.0003862 0.0067** -0.0043241
(0.0064015) (0.0028932) (0.0041419)
bureaucratic obstacles burcy 0.0526*** 0.0534*** 0.0339*** 0.0231***
(0.0091853) (0.0039932) (0.0062238) (0.0040531)
polity obstacles polity -0.00000214 0.0210*** 0.0169***
(0.0000269) (0.0052245) (0.0035794)
bid for government work govtbid 0.0253938 0.0461*** 0.0067534 0.0126*
(0.0185547) (0.0090631) (0.009708) (0.006865)
Country level variables:
gdp per capita gdpcap -0.00000629 -0.000010*** -0.00002*** -0.00001***
(0.00000548) (0.00000256) (0.00000388) (0.00000131)
regulatory efficiency regeff -0.0029837 -0.0076***
(0.0031865) (0.0023964)
secondary school enrolment edsecond 0.0037* 0.0027*** -0.0034*** -0.0013***
(0.002133) (0.0006382) (0.0007758) (0.0003358)
tertiary education enrolment edtertiary -0.0030105 0.0034***
(0.0021654) (0.0010624)
new business starts enterprise -0.0254245 -0.0316*** 0.0024366
(0.0172165) (0.009447) (0.0068784)
natural resource rents natresrents 0.0000713 0.0072***
(0.0036711) (0.0019057)
trade openness tradeopen 0.0007433 0.0027*** 0.0042***
(0.0012497) (0.0005291) (0.0003043)
country dummy variables yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 2249 12523 6151 14316
LR chi2(42) 275.06 1405.23 518.63 1606.16
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0
Log likelihood -876.05201 -5136.2637 -2075.8909 -4741.5728
Pseudo R2 0.1357 0.1203 0.111 0.1448
Note: standard errors are in parentheses, *** significant at 99% confidence, ** 95% and * 90%
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TABLE 2: TWO-STEP PROBIT WITH ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS
SAMPLE 1 (2009-2010) SAMPLE 2 (2013-2015)
First step regression (endogenous  variable = foreign) First step regression (endogenous  variable = foreign)
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
licansing 4.147076*** 0.43033 9.64 0.000 licansing 4.942706*** 0.44367 11.14 0.000
size 2.857678*** 0.20819 13.73 0.000 size 3.175611*** 0.21493 14.77 0.000
femown -0.7001542** 0.33663 -2.08 0.038 burcy 0.5188671** 0.25633 2.02 0.043
burcy 0.545719** 0.24795 2.2 0.028 polity -0.17623 0.22213 -0.79 0.428
polity -0.21881 0.21480 -1.02 0.308 govtbid -1.007452** 0.42000 -2.4 0.016
gdpcapita 0.0000929** 0.00004 2.18 0.029 gdpcapita 0.0001895*** 0.00004 4.34 0.000
edsecond -0.01407 0.01178 -1.19 0.232 edsecond -0.01208 0.01222 -0.99 0.323
edtertiary -0.037645*** 0.01141 -3.3 0.001 edtertiary -0.0493541*** 0.01178 -4.19 0.000
natresrents -0.1045021*** 0.01613 -6.48 0.000 natresrents -0.1207616*** 0.01664 -7.26 0.000
constant 3.228381*** 0.95600 3.38 0.001 constant 2.553279*** 0.99393 2.57 0.010
Number of observations 14992 Number of observations 14,963
F(9, 14982) 45.830 F(9, 14953) 54.640
Prob > F 0.000 Prob > F 0.000
R-squared 0.027 R-squared 0.032
Adj R-squared 0.026 Adj R-squared 0.031
Second step - probit , dependent variable = bribe (0,1) Second step - probit , dependent variable = bribe (0,1)
Coef. Std. Err. z P>z Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
foreign 0.01235 0.00886 1.39 0.163 foreign 0.01011 0.00741 1.36 0.173
size -0.0732883** 0.03259 -2.25 0.025 size -0.0754886** 0.03110 -2.43 0.015
femown 0.091903*** 0.02973 3.09 0.002 burcy 0.1376875*** 0.02084 6.61 0.000
burcy 0.1349797*** 0.02109 6.4 0.000 polity 0.0979363*** 0.01766 5.55 0.000
polity 0.1006286*** 0.01771 5.68 0.000 govtbid 0.0980295*** 0.03425 2.86 0.004
gdpcapita -0.0000429*** 0.00000 -11.28 0.000 gdpcapita -0.0000451*** 0.00000 -11.46 0.000
edsecond -0.0116734*** 0.00104 -11.28 0.000 edsecond -0.0110623*** 0.00103 -10.69 0.000
edtertiary 0.0122419*** 0.00111 11.06 0.000 edtertiary 0.0123098*** 0.00112 10.99 0.000
natresrents 0.0126534*** 0.00178 7.09 0.000 natresrents 0.0120955*** 0.00177 6.84 0.000
constant -0.6659479*** 0.08406 -7.92 0.000 constant -0.679189*** 0.08118 -8.37 0.000
Wald chi2(9) 631.02  Wald chi2(9) 621.41
Prob > chi2 0.000 Prob > chi2 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(1) 1.84 Wald test of exogeneity: chi2(1) 1.63
 Prob > chi2 0.1753  Prob > chi2 0.2023
Weak instruments tests: Weak instruments tests:
Null: beta[bribe:foreign] = 0 Null: beta[bribe:foreign] = 0
Test Statistic p-value Test Statistic p-value
Anderson-Rubin chi2(1)   = 0.1591 Anderson-Rubin chi2(1)   = 1.88 0.1700
Wald chi2(1)   = 0.1633 Wald chi2(1)   = 1.86 0.1728
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TABLE 3: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING USING SAMPLE 1
Variable Sample Treated Controls DifferenceS.E. T-stat Observations
Treatment variable : foreign1
bribe Unmatched 0.175676 0.163786 0.01189 0.022862 0.52 Untreated 2,430
ATT 0.176871 0.170316 0.006555 0.026833 0.24 Treated 296
Treatment variable : foreign3
bribe Unmatched 0.162791 0.163206 -0.00042 0.026312 0.02 Untreated 2,408
ATT 0.162791 0.200053 -0.03726 0.031291 1.19 Treated 215
Treatment variable : joint venture
bribe Unmatched 0.301587 0.162977 0.13861 0.047407 2.92** Untreated 2,620
ATT 0.290323 0.179843 0.110479 0.059359 1.86* Treated 63
Treatment variable :  bureaucracy (0,1)
bribe Unmatched 0.176213 0.07989 0.096324 0.020793 4.63*** Untreated 2,287
ATT 0.176213 0.0964 0.079814 0.029468 2.71*** Treated 363
Treatment variable: Government bid
bribe Unmatched 0.231445 0.163803 0.067642 0.012786 5.29*** Untreated 6,134
ATT 0.231672 0.179993 0.051679 0.014268 3.62*** Treated 1,050
Treatment variable :  polity (0,1)
bribe Unmatched 0.198925 0.159316 0.039609 0.008412 4.71*** Untreated 4,852
ATT 0.198925 0.143475 0.05545 0.011122 4.99*** Treated 3,534
Note: standard errors are bootstrapped, *** significant at 99%, ** 95%, * 90%
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TABLE 4: PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING USING SAMPLE 2       
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat Observations   
Treatment variable : 
foreign1               
bribe Unmatched 0.131148 0.116185 0.014962 0.011851 1.26 Untreated 10,423 
  ATT 0.131148 0.110169 0.020978 0.01206 1.58 Treated 793 
Treatment variable : 
foreign3   
   
      
bribe Unmatched 0.133581 0.115258 0.018323 0.014158 1.29 Untreated 10,316 
  ATT 0.13197 0.115592 0.016379 0.016529 0.99 Treated 539 
Treatment variable : 
joint venture   
   
      
bribe Unmatched 0.147436 0.114502 0.032933 0.025718 1.28 Untreated 11,074 
  ATT 0.148387 0.1131 0.035287 0.026039 1.36 Treated 156 
Treatment variable :  
bureaucracy (0,1)   
   
      
bribe Unmatched 0.188312 0.128849 0.059462 0.009672 6.15*** Untreated 12,177 
  ATT 0.188448 0.149429 0.039018 0.012288 3.18*** Treated 1,386 
Treatment variable: 
Government bid   
   
      
bribe Unmatched 0.153123 0.125849 0.027273 0.00729 3.74*** Untreated 11,037 
  ATT 0.153123 0.125849 0.027273 0.008708 3.13*** Treated 2,658 
Treatment variable :  
polity (0,1)   
   
      
bribe Unmatched 0.205357 0.119467 0.08589 0.007678 11.19*** Untreated 11,476 
  ATT 0.205357 0.166913 0.038445 0.010883 3.64*** Treated 2,352 
Note: standard errors are bootstrapped, *** significant at 99%, ** 95%, * 90%   
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Table 5:  IPWRA Analysis for Sample 1 (2009-10)
Treatment Group
Control Group None Foreign1 Bureaucracy Both
None - 0.0254701 0.0662496*** 0.0745474***
(0.0227301) (0.0097647) (0.0243452)
Foreign Ownership -0.0124424 - 0.0476071 0.0296977
(foreign1) (0.0294352) (0.0395347) (0.0314002)
Bureaucracy an Obstacle -0.0588978*** -0.0151998 - -0.0040684
(0.0112416) (0.0307986) (0.0263499)
Both -0.0762259** -0.0017697 0.0065233 -
(0.0396438) (0.0374224) (0.0315063)
Treatment Group
Control Group None Foreign1 Polity Both
None - 0.0370595* 0.0687005*** 0.073147***
(0.021609) (0.0126031) (0.0285161)
Foreign Ownership -0.0387405 - -0.0154483 0.0147903
(foreign1) (0.0263962) (0.0446246) (0.0381397)
Polity -0.0167675 0.039966 - 0.0095754
(0.0144882) (0.0317785) (0.0268444)
Both 0.0491044* 0.0477502 -0.0017756 -
(0.0262753) (0.0396293) (0.0307682)
Treatment Group
Control Group None Foreign1 Governmentt Bid Both
None - 0.0162415 0.0520692*** 0.1026281***
(0.0187467) (0.0143272) (0.0387941)
Foreign Ownership -0.0224348 - 0.0262071 0.0867351**
(foreign1) (0.0221662) (0.0263953) (0.0416359)
Bid for Government -0.0542503*** 0.027425 - 0.0649752
Contract (0.0151866) (0.0151866) (0.0419252)
Both -0.0925371* -0.1003095** -0.0398889 -
(0.0519179) (0.0485625) (0.0503048)
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Table 6:  IPWRA Analysis for Sample 2 (2013-15)
Treatment Group
Control Group None Foreign1 Bureaucracy Both
None - 0.0060622 0.0818743*** 0.1783046***
(0.012927) (0.0092697) (0.0371229)
Foreign Ownership 0.0074532 - 0.0902489*** 0.1681178***
(foreign1) (0.0164054) (0.0175682) (0.0395061)
Bureaucracy an Obstacle -0.0893128*** -0.0676008*** - 0.0887312**
(0.0098249) (0.0186503) (0.040203)
Both -0.2691205*** -0.1574655*** -0.1687719*** -
(0.067649) (0.0387912) (0.0644569)
Treatment Group
Control Group None Foreign1 Polity Both
None - 0.0056734 0.0540383*** 0.1867473***
(0.0126148) (0.0112334) (0.0374443)
Foreign Ownership 0.0089766 - 0.0330255 0.1311705***
(foreign1) (0.0152307) (0.0306189) (0.0454263)
Polity -0.0496246*** -0.0504314** - 0.1146705***
(0.0130178) (0.0231308) (0.0391749)
Both -0.2884424*** -0.116596** -0.1664501*** -
(0.0841213) (0.055556) (0.0620418)
Treatment Group
Control Group None Foreign1 Governmentt Bid Both
None - 0.0224129 0.0243541*** 0.0340775
(0.0138468) (0.008169) (0.0276326)
Foreign Ownership -0.0060577 - 0.0133222 0.0115531
(foreign1) (0.0176021) (0.0184377) (0.03041)
Bid for Government -0.0199305** 0.0083291 - 0.0137962
Contract (0.0082722) (0.0167475) (0.0291011)
Both -0.1236367** -0.0324785 -0.1043204** -
(0.0561414) (0.0341839) (0.0508602)
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Appendix 1 : Number of Observations  by Country
Sample 1 Sample 2
Albania 175 360
Argentina 1054
Armenia 374 360
Azerbaijan 380 390
Belarus 273 360
Bhutan 250 253
Bosnia-Herzegovina 361 360
Brazil 1802
Bulgaria 288 293
Croatia 159 360
Czech 250 254
DR Congo 359 529
Estonia 273 273
Georgia 373 360
Hungary 291 310
Indonesia 1444 1320
Kazakhstan 544 600
Kosovo 270 202
Kyrgyzstan 235 270
Latvia 271 336
Lithuania 276 270
Macedonia 366 360
Madagascar 445 532
Malawi 150 523
Mexico 1480
Moldova 363 360
Mongolia 362 360
Montenegro 116 150
Nepal 486 482
Nigeria 6314 2676
Poland 455 542
Romania 541 540
Russia 1004 4220
Serbia 388 360
Slovakia 275 268
Slovenia 276 270
Tajikistan 360 359
Turkey 1152 1344
Ukraine 851 1002
Uzbekistan 366 390
Vietnam 1053 996
TOTAL 26505 23194
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Appendix 2:  Sample 1 - Selected Characteristics by Sector
Observations Number of full time employees Sample Mean Mean score of perceived obstacles
% foreign % of sales Age of (scored 0-4)
Mean Maximum Minimum ownership exported firm (years) Corruption Infrastructure Bureaucracy
Food manufacture 2741 169 21955 0 7.2 9.5 20.0 1.80 1.86 1.28
Tobacco products 3 357 658 206 0.0 21.0 24.3 1.33 2.17 1.50
Textiles 852 158 3200 0 9.3 23.5 20.2 1.72 1.35 1.36
Garments 1755 128 7400 0 6.8 19.4 16.9 1.95 1.71 1.35
Leather 169 149 6150 2 4.5 11.9 19.0 2.53 1.93 2.12
Wood products 224 49 2650 0 1.2 5.3 15.8 1.94 2.56 0.94
Paper products 35 132 757 4 1.1 10.8 17.4 1.33 1.62 0.74
Printing and publishing 290 19 272 2 0.5 1.1 19.0 2.03 2.85 1.08
Chemicals 970 129 3066 0 10.8 11.1 24.8 1.98 1.76 1.63
Plastics and rubber 556 117 2000 0 11.7 11.7 19.7 1.73 1.85 1.18
Mineral Products 1163 80 4585 0 3.8 7.7 16.1 1.56 1.89 1.03
Basic metals 184 297 17167 1 8.9 15.2 18.5 1.41 2.18 1.30
Metal products 1227 62 2300 0 6.9 10.0 17.1 1.77 2.13 1.25
Machinery 1041 117 4000 0 9.5 15.1 23.2 2.23 1.74 1.70
Electrical machinery 176 208 3000 0 19.4 23.0 23.3 1.79 1.85 1.33
Electronics 7 162 755 6 14.3 20.3 16.6 0.86 1.43 0.68
Vehicles 163 217 4100 3 13.7 9.2 24.6 2.73 2.68 3.34
Other transport equipment 14 279 2000 22 7.9 14.3 16.4 1.36 1.21 0.81
Furniture, jewellery, games 844 27 1225 1 0.6 2.2 16.8 1.92 2.64 1.40
Other manufacturing 1922 114 20843 0 9.5 14.6 19.8 1.74 1.63 1.32
Recycling 4 164 182 145 50.0 100.0 9.5 2.00 3.00 1.63
Construction 1198 126 5133 0 4.0 3.7 16.4 1.79 1.30 1.10
Vehicle maintenance 454 62 4225 0 5.7 3.9 15.8 1.74 1.42 1.25
Wholesale 1146 76 4000 0 11.0 8.5 14.3 1.86 1.41 1.19
Retail 3749 84 20500 0 5.8 3.0 14.8 1.82 1.55 1.23
Hotels and restaurants 529 49 930 0 7.3 4.4 15.8 1.75 1.39 1.10
Land transport 674 224 37772 0 9.3 18.1 17.4 1.84 1.37 1.22
Water Transport 4 147 320 22 20.5 1.3 17.5 1.00 1.25 1.31
Support transport services 8 72 230 1 16.1 1.0 15.3 0.60 1.35 0.83
IT services 362 115 5500 1 9.4 7.8 14.5 2.24 1.77 1.63
SAMPLE 26505 102 37772 0 6.5 8.6 17.2 1.90 1.82 1.31
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Appendix 3:  Sample 2 - Selected Characteristics by Sector
Observations Number of full time employees Sample Mean Mean score of perceived obstacles
% foreign % of sales Age of (scored 0-4)
Mean Maximum Minimum ownership exported firm (years) Corruption Infrastructure Bureaucracy
Food manufacture 1764 133 12467 0 5.7 12.9 17.5 1.19 1.11 0.75
Tobacco products 49 157 900 1 12.6 23.0 19.0 1.07 1.19 0.94
Textiles 571 146 5033 0 4.6 22.5 17.7 1.12 1.01 0.80
Garments 1091 129 9125 0 6.0 26.4 15.6 1.32 0.98 0.76
Leather 142 137 2017 0 7.8 35.8 15.4 1.23 1.33 0.96
Wood products 448 40 690 0 4.2 18.1 15.2 1.25 1.13 0.82
Paper products 95 77 1200 0 8.7 11.4 15.9 1.24 1.15 0.82
Printing and publishing 576 29 410 0 3.9 5.6 16.5 1.47 1.17 0.73
Fuels 27 86 601 2 23.0 26.2 26.9 1.81 1.12 0.88
Chemicals 643 138 5869 0 9.9 17.3 19.1 1.24 1.15 0.91
Plastics and rubber 527 116 17000 0 6.7 9.8 16.5 1.24 1.29 0.88
Mineral Products 1179 107 7000 0 5.4 12.7 17.2 1.34 1.08 0.75
Basic metals 169 80 2530 0 10.1 19.7 16.9 1.53 1.18 0.87
Metal products 1003 64 2450 0 3.9 17.0 15.7 1.27 1.05 0.81
Machinery 590 87 6001 0 7.8 15.5 17.0 1.36 0.84 0.75
Office machinery 24 45 450 3 0.0 8.8 12.2 1.25 0.73 0.84
Electrical machinery 263 114 3500 3 7.1 11.8 16.5 1.34 0.85 0.78
Electronics 33 150 1636 3 10.6 18.0 16.9 1.06 1.09 0.69
Vehicles 184 80 3500 2 3.1 10.8 15.3 1.26 0.88 0.85
Other transport equipment 59 152 2640 5 9.0 21.8 20.5 1.05 0.90 0.82
Furniture, jewellery, games 642 42 2000 0 3.9 12.7 14.8 1.49 1.26 0.92
Other manufacturing 86 37 362 3 2.8 16.4 16.4 0.63 1.16 1.04
Recycling 47 68 970 5 6.0 12.9 15.7 1.49 1.35 1.15
Construction 1472 71 3000 0 2.6 3.2 14.1 1.36 0.82 0.72
Vehicle maintenance 657 36 3897 0 4.2 5.8 14.4 1.48 1.09 0.87
Wholesale 2715 39 7050 0 4.7 5.1 12.0 1.36 1.00 0.76
Retail 4551 45 9850 0 4.2 4.3 14.5 1.17 0.94 0.77
Hotels and restaurants 1033 33 1117 0 3.6 5.5 14.1 1.30 1.09 0.78
Land transport 508 99 17000 0 6.2 18.3 15.4 1.48 0.96 0.87
Water Transport 3 119 290 7 0.0 10.0 19.0 2.00 0.44 0.50
Air Transport 5 53 200 0 4.0 46.0 17.3 2.40 1.87 1.40
Support transport services 305 70 4100 0 6.4 13.4 13.5 1.16 0.93 0.67
Post and telecommunications 170 65 1150 0 7.3 3.6 13.2 1.43 1.09 0.77
IT services 280 24 330 0 6.4 10.0 11.1 1.41 1.13 0.80
SAMPLE 23194 73 17000 0 5.7 10.5 15.2 1.30 1.03 0.80
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Appendix 4:  WBES Questions Relating to Bribery 
percentage of sample: percentage of responses*
no response don't know refuse don't know refuse
(blank entry)
Questions relating to bribery:
In reference to that application for an electrical connection, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested? 83.8% 0.36% 0.19% 2.24% 1.19%
In reference to that application for a water connection, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested? 92.2% 0.20% 0.12% 2.52% 1.54%
In any of these [tax] inspections or meetings was a gift or informal payment expected or requested? 39.9% 1.20% 1.79% 1.99% 2.98%
Percent of the{government] contract value paid as informal payments or gifts 67.5% 2.36% 1.47% 7.25% 4.52%
In reference to that application for an import license, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested? 79.1% 0.32% 0.24% 3.27% 2.38%
In reference to that application for an operating license, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested? 90.1% 0.58% 0.57% 2.78% 2.73%
Total annual cost of informal payments* 1.2% 9.8% 6.7% 9.9% 6.8%
*It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done” 
with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of 
total annual sales, or estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials 
for this purpose?
percentage of sample:
Related questions with high "no response" rates: no response don't know
Length of wait for an electrical connection 83.99% 0.40%
Average number of incidents of water insufficiency per month 93.94% 0.27%
Number of times inspected by or met with tax officials 40.16% 0.53%
Over the last year, has this establishment secured or attempted to secure a government contract? 17.58% 1.14%
Approximately how many days did it take to obtain this import license from the day of the application to the day it was granted? 92.03% 0.40%
Approximately how many days did it take to obtain this operating license from the day of the application to the day it was granted? 81.03% 0.39%
All questions (% of sample); percentage of sample:
no response don't know
(blank entry)
minimum 0.03% 0.00%
maximum 98.05% 7.57%
mean 38.43% 1.19%
Note:  for the purposes of calculation "no response" is a blank entry; "don't knows" and "refuse to answer" are treated as responses in these calculations
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Appendix 5: Analysis by country of responses to bribery question
It is said that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things done”
 with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. On average, what percent of total annual sales, or estimated 
total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this purpose?
Country Proprtion of respondents* Respondents* no respone refused to answer don't know
who paid a bribe (blank entry)
Albania 12.9% 72.3% 0.0% 11.2% 16.4%
Argentina 13.8% 85.3% 0.0% 0.6% 14.1%
Armenia 7.3% 94.6% 0.0% 3.4% 2.0%
Azerbaijan 14.3% 80.6% 0.0% 14.9% 4.4%
Belarus 7.9% 87.5% 0.0% 7.3% 5.2%
Bhutan 3.2% 98.6% 0.0% 0.4% 1.0%
Bosnia-Herzegovina 7.2% 89.0% 0.0% 2.2% 8.7%
Brazil 12.8% 91.3% 0.0% 1.6% 7.0%
Bulgaria 10.1% 73.1% 0.0% 8.1% 18.8%
Croatia 11.3% 88.4% 0.0% 1.5% 10.0%
Czech 9.6% 86.9% 0.0% 4.2% 8.9%
DR Congo 44.8% 77.7% 3.7% 10.0% 8.6%
Estonia 1.6% 82.1% 0.0% 2.4% 15.6%
Georgia 1.4% 85.4% 0.0% 4.4% 10.2%
Hungary 6.5% 84.2% 0.0% 12.6% 3.2%
Indonesia 15.6% 84.4% 0.0% 8.3% 7.3%
Kazakhstan 16.6% 81.4% 0.0% 10.8% 7.9%
Kosovo 10.7% 85.0% 0.0% 3.0% 12.1%
Kyrgyzstan 40.2% 79.8% 0.0% 7.9% 12.3%
Latvia 5.9% 72.5% 0.0% 2.5% 25.0%
Lithuania 8.3% 87.9% 0.0% 4.2% 7.9%
Macedonia 9.1% 88.0% 0.0% 2.6% 9.4%
Madagascar 21.3% 43.8% 56.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Malawi 10.0% 83.5% 0.0% 6.4% 10.1%
Mexico 10.0% 98.1% 0.0% 0.3% 1.6%
Moldova 13.1% 82.6% 0.0% 7.1% 10.4%
Mongolia 30.0% 90.9% 0.0% 3.7% 5.4%
Montenegro 10.0% 83.1% 0.0% 3.8% 13.2%
Nepal 12.5% 91.4% 0.0% 4.5% 4.0%
Nigeria 51.4% 90.8% 0.0% 7.8% 1.3%
Poland 8.0% 81.9% 0.0% 8.1% 9.9%
Romania 12.2% 80.2% 0.0% 5.5% 14.3%
Russia 15.5% 78.9% 0.0% 7.8% 13.2%
Serbia 16.6% 78.3% 0.0% 1.9% 19.8%
Slovakia 8.9% 82.9% 0.0% 7.7% 9.4%
Slovenia 8.9% 90.1% 0.0% 0.7% 9.2%
Tajikistan 29.4% 74.8% 0.0% 12.1% 13.1%
Turkey 7.3% 92.6% 0.0% 3.6% 3.8%
Ukraine 34.6% 39.8% 0.0% 6.1% 54.1%
Uzbekistan 26.7% 91.7% 0.0% 4.5% 3.8%
Vietnam 47.2% 56.1% 0.0% 23.5% 20.4%
FULL SAMPLE 22.4% 82.3% 1.2% 6.7% 9.8%
minimum 1.4% 39.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
maximum 51.4% 98.6% 56.2% 23.5% 54.1%
*Note: for the purposes of calculating respondents in this case, a "refuse" or "don't know" response is treated as a non-response
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APPENDIX 6:  CHECKS FOR BIAS ON OBSERVABLES – SAMPLE 1 
Treatment variable: foreign1 
 
Treatment variable: foreign3 
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Treatment variable: jointvent 
 
Treatment variable: burcy1 
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Treatment variable: govtbid 
 
 
Treatment variable: polity1 
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APPENDIX 7:  CHECKS FOR BIAS ON OBSERVABLES – SAMPLE 2 
Treatment variable: foreign1 
 
Treatment variable: foreign3 
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Treatment variable: jointvent 
 
 
Treatment variable: burcy1 
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Treatment variable: govtbid 
 
Treatment variable: polity1 
 
